The wars in Libya and Iraq and a lesson from history

So, with the Libyan conflict seemingly heading towards a resolution is it now time to compare the British endevour in North Africa to the Second Gulf War. The National Transitional Council (NTC) is now in control of most of the strategic cities: Sirte and Bani Walid are now the last remaining Gaddafi strongholds holding out in the vain hope that a miracle will change their fortunes. However, should Gadafi have been able to look at Iraq, his strategic position and history and realise that after 40 years in power the game was up?

It would be easy to conclude that the Second Gulf War and the Libyan war are both examples of invasions to impose western imperialism and are, consequently, doomed to failure? Well, it seems historic strategic theory of the likes of Clausewitz, would have it differently. Iraq and Libya are completely different militarily strategic engagements. The Second Gulf War was a war imposed from outside by the former President of the United States of America, George W. Bush and his companion former Prime Minister Tony Blair: in short, it was a war of agression. It was an attempt by an outside force to defeat another sovereign state by force. The situation was not provoked in any way by domestic violence caused by discontent within Iraq. The citizens of Iraq never desired their country to be forcefully invaded by a foreign force.

The experience in Iraq is in starck contrast to the NATO operation in Libya spearheaded by Nicolas Sarkozy of France and the coalition in the UK. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 that led to the activities, specifically to a no-fly zone over Libya and measures to prevent civilian lose of life. Critically, the measures kept the permitted boundaries of  involvement limited to a defensive position. Both Iraq and Libya followed the truism that 'the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it'. However, in Libyan it was realised that 'defence is a stronger form of war: the one that makes the enemy's defeat more certain'.  

The Iraq conflict was based on the a supposed nuclear threat. It was a cynical attempt to enforce the 'paradoxical trinity' of warfare including violence, hatred and emnity in order to invade another soverign state. The Libyan war was an attempt to prevent a very real threat of crimes against humanity being commited by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi during a popular uprising. The intervention was because of a realisation that 'the fact remains that a national uprising cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger'.                                                              

Both the wars in Iraq and in Libya attempted to interpret the lessons of Clausewitz about war between states. However, the widely accepted failure of Iraq and the relative success of Libya shows that it is easy to misinterpret these lessons.The resulting swift capture of much of Libya by the NTC, aided by NATO fire power proves that 'the greater the strategic success, the greater the likelihood of a victorious engagement'. The NATO emphasis on its role in defending civilians while allowing the NTC to continue its campaign against Gaddafi's forces was an example of the correct application of Clausewitz's advice. He advised that 'the natural course in war is to begin defensively and end by attacking'. In Iraq, the US and UK begun by attacking whilst in Libya NATO airplanes took on a defensive position of protecting civilians which had the support of many of the citizens of the sovereign state concerned. The masterminds of the Libyan campaign had learn't the lessons of history.